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TAKING STOCK IN THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE:
CAN STATES PROVIDE FOR PUBLIC BEACH
ACCESS WITHOUT RUNNING AFOUL OF
REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE?
Sean T Morris+
I. WAR FOR THE SHORE
There are battles brewing along our nation's shorelines.' In America
today, more than half of the population lives within fifty miles of the
coast and seventy percent of the property abutting that coastline is
privately owned.2 In California, the nation's most populous state, an
estimated eighty percent of its more than thirty-four million citizens live
within an hour's drive of the ocean.3 The combination of a growing
population and the increased privatization of beachfront property has
4
generated a great deal of conflict over beach access.
The conflict pits the public and its right to enjoy the beach against the
private property rights of coastal property owners.5  In southern
California, with its legendary lifestyle of sun and surf, the battle over the
shoreline is particularly fierce.6 Malibu, for example, can be thought of
' J.D. Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. See Bill Schneider, Coastline Access: The Battle Over Beachfront Ownership, at
http://www.cnn.com/2OO2/ALLPOLITICS/O8/09/ip.pol.beach (Aug. 9, 2002).
2. Id.
3. Martin Kasindorf, Malibu's Rich and Famous Fight to Keep Beach Private, USA
TODAY, May 3, 2002, at Al; see also John Krist, Lawmakers Act to Preserve Coastal
Access, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, at http://www.enn.com/news/enn-
stories/2002/10/10042002/s_48590.asp (Oct. 4 2002) (citing a 1997 report by the Public
Research Institute of San Francisco State University that reported, "California residents
account for 48t million annual visitor days at the coast, and the average family makes 15
beach trips a year").
4. James M. Kehoe, Note, The Next Wave in Public Beach Access., Removal of
States as Trustees of Public Trust Properties, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 191.5 (1995); see
also Timothy Egan, Owners of Malibu Mansions Cry, This Sand is My Sand, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2002, at Al (quoting Robert Ritchie, Director of Research, Huntington Library,
San Marino, Cal.)("[B]ecause a very significant percentage of the United States
population now lives in counties facing the ocean, the pressure for public access has
become enormous. At the same time, you have these homeowners fighting to keep the
hordes back.").
5. Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1913-14.
6. Egan, supra note 4, at Al. One property owner in Santa Barbara County,
California, has already paid $460,000 in fines during her fight to block access to the 500-
foot strip of beach that lies below her 25-acre estate. Id. The case, along with a similar
1015
Catholic University Law Review
as the western front in the war over beach access. There, wealthy
property owners have been trying, via lawsuits and court orders, to keep
the public-at-large from accessing the beaches in front of their multi-
million dollar estates
Many of the battles in southern California involve easements that were
required by the State as a condition for building along the coastline in the
1980s.8 The State rarely sought to enforce them until quite recently.9 In
an effort to provide for greater access to the shore, the California Coastal
Commission has begun enforcing these easements and is hoping to use
them to cut a path to the beach every thousand feet along the shore. ° In
response, some affected property owners have taken the Coastal
Commission to court.' Their argument is that providing for public beach
access via their private property amounts to a taking without just
one, was denied a hearing by the Supreme Court in October of 2002. Daniel v. Santa
Barbara County, 537 U.S. 973 (2002) (denying petition for writ of certiorari). In response,
the land owner issued a statement in which she said she was "disappointed" and that it was
her hope that the "U.S. Supreme Court will come around as it did with civil rights and stop
the California Coastal Commission from expropriating private property." David G.
Savage & Kenneth R. Weiss, Justices Bolster Beach Access, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at
Al.
7. See Kasindorf, supra note 3. In Malibu, California, the battle centers around a
three-mile stretch of beach to which there is no public beach access due to a continuous
line of residences. Id. One advocate of beach access easements frames the issue in this
way: "These people can afford to have a $5 million home for a second home, and they're
never there, and yet they still want it locked up .... It ain't your backyard, buddy. It
belongs to the people." Id
8. Ed Vulliamy, Celebs vs Plebs in the Battle of Malibu Beach, THE OBSERVER,
May 19, 2002. The property owner seeking to build had to make an Offer to Dedicate
(OTD). Krist, supra note 3. Before granting a coastal development permit, the California
Coastal Commission "required that the private landowner offer an easement, generally 10-
25 feet wide, to a government agency or nonprofit organization. Once a recipient accepts
the offer-contingent on its acceptance of liability and responsibility for maintenance of
the access route-it obtains title to the easement." Id.
9. Kasindorf, supra note 3 (describing the public right of way options as "half-
forgotten"); see also Krist, supra note 3 (noting that "[i]f no public or private entity
accepts the [public right of way option], it generally expires after 21 years").
10. Kasindorf, supra note 3; see also Brian Doherty, Their Own Private Malibu,
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2002, at A]6 (listing some of the "relevant area homeowners with as-
yet-unopened easements on or near their property").
11. Doherty, supra note 10. In January of 2002, Access for All, an organization
dedicated to providing for public access to California's beaches, adopted an easement that
entertainment mogul David Geffen had dedicated in 1983 and which was set to expire in
2004. Id.; see also Egan, supra note 4. Geffen sued the California Coastal Commission
and claimed that opening the easement violated his property and equal protection rights.
Doherty, supra note 10; see also Egan, supra note 4 (noting that although Geffen
promised to allow for access 19 years ago, he "now says it would be unsafe, dirty and
impractical to allow people to walk by his home to the beach").
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compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 1
Similar battles are being fought on many other fronts.13 From Maine to
Miami, and Long Island Sound to Puget Sound, the fight taking place in
Malibu is repeating itself throughout the country. 14  Most of these
lawsuits concern the issue of beach access, and many involve the use of
the Public Trust Doctrine. 5 The Public Trust Doctrine is an ancient
concept providing that submerged lands and those lying seaward of the
mean high tide mark are held by the state in trust for the public and, as
such, are not subject to private ownership." However, if privatelandowners can exclude the public from gaining access to the large
12. Egan, supra note 4; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states that "[n]o person shall .. .be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Id.
13. See Gail Diane Cox, Coast to Coast to Court, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20, 2001, at Al
(outlining beach access lawsuits in Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina and
California). One of the most prominent of these lawsuits was Leydon v. Town of
Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001). Greenwich, Connecticut is a wealthy suburb of
New York City with a population of approximately 58,000. Geraldine Baum, Falling
Public Beach Access is Kicking Up a Sandstorm, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, May 19, 2002, at
13A. The town got in trouble in 1994 after officials stopped law student Brenden Leydon
at the gate to Greenwich Point Park and denied him access to the park and its half-mile-
long beach. Id. Leydon happened to be studying a case on the Public Trust Doctrine and
decided to challenge Greenwich's policy of denying beach access-he won. Id. Although
Leydon was inspired to bring the case by the Public Trust Doctrine, the case was
eventually decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court, not by relying on the Public Trust
Doctrine as the lower appellate court had, but rather on First Amendment grounds.
Leydon, 777 A.2d at 565. The court held that denying access to non-residents was a
violation of the right to freedom of expression, as the beach and surrounding park was a
"traditional public forum." Id. at 568. Nevertheless, the end result was the same, and the
beach was opened to non-residents. Id. at 579-80.
14. See Cox, supra note 13; see also David L. Greene, Beach Prohibition in Deep
Water: Court Tells Conn. Town to Open Park to Public, BALT. SUN, June 4, 2000, at Al,
available at 2000 WL 4870574 (describing the fight over beach access in Greenwich,
Connecticut); Lisa Woods, Private Beaches a Public Issue: Ownership, Access Areas
Raise Debate, FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 24, 2002 at L1, available at 2002 WL 5968133
(reporting on a similar conflict in Florida); Brian Feagans, 'Serious Threat" Suit Aims For
Private Beaches, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), July 25, 1998, at 1A, available at
1998 WL 12698353 (discussing a lawsuit brought over beach access in North Carolina);
Michael Serrill, The Gritty Battle for Beach Access, TIME, Aug. 27, 1984, at 48, available
at 1984 WL 2059021 (reporting on Maine property owners building fences, towing cars,
and throwing rocks in order to keep beachgoers off their land).
15. Cox, supra note 13.
16. See Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property. Judicial
Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627 (1989) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1988)). Phillips Petroleum and its discussion of the
Public Trust Doctrine will be addressed later in this Note. See infra Part MAJ.
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number of the nation's beaches that lie adjacent to private property,
these trust lands effectively become private property.
17
Recently, property rights advocates have challenged some of the
efforts of municipalities to provide for public beach access on the ground
that such efforts amount to government takings.' This Note will
examine the application of regulatory takings analysis to the Public Trust
Doctrine. Specifically, it will argue that, by using the Public Trust
Doctrine, states can overcome takings challenges by private property
owners. This Note will show that access easements can be based on the
legitimate state purpose of upholding the Public Trust Doctrine, which
trumps any purported exclusionary rights of the affected property
owners. Essentially, this Note will argue that the public's right of access
to our nation's beaches predates any private property rights, and that it is
the responsibility and duty of state governments, as trustees of these
lands, to ensure future beach access.
II. WHERE WE HAVE BEEN, WHERE WE ARE GOING: LEGAL
BACKGROUND OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REGULATORY
TAKINGS
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
1. Historical Development: 1500 Years in the Making
The Public Trust Doctrine embodies legal concepts that date back to
the sixth century A.D.' 9 The Byzantine Emperor Justinian provided in
his compendium of Roman law principles that "by the law of nature
these things are common to mankind-the air, running water, the sea,
and consequently the shores of the sea." '' By the law of Rome, the
21seashore was not subject to private ownership.
17. See Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1913.
18. Id. at 1913-14 (noting the "diametrically opposed views" of beach access
proponents who argue that the public should have the right of access to every beach
regardless of whether the beachfront property is privately or publicly owned, and
beachfront homeowners who believe that the public should only be allowed access to
public beaches).
19. Vulliamy, supra note 8; see also Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1918 (noting that "[t]he
Romans, in creating their laws, borrowed heavily from the Greeks, who were very
dependent on the resources of the sea").
20. Frank Langella, Note, Public Access to New York and New Jersey Beaches. Has
Either State Adequately Fulfilled Its Responsibilities as Trustee Under the Public Trust
Doctrine?, 44 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 179, [82 (2000) (quoting THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN, bk. 2, 65 (J. Thomas trans. 1975)); see also Kehoe, supra at note 4, at 1918
(quoting Roman law as declaring that "[n]o one therefore is forbidden access to the
seashore").
21. Langella, supra note 20, at 182.
1018 [Vol. 52:1015
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Under English common law, the Public Trust Doctrine evolved to
mean that certain land was not simply common property, but that the
title was held by the king or sovereign in trust for the benefit of the
public.2 2 This concept of the Public Trust was later adopted in colonial
America as part of the English common law and continued to develop in
American case law.23  Though greatly varying in its application
throughout the states, the Public Trust Doctrine has been adopted, in
24some form, by nearly every state .
While the concepts underlying the Public Trust Doctrine date back to
the earliest days of colonial America, it was not until 1892 that the
United States Supreme Court fully enunciated the concept of the Public
Trust.25 In the landmark case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the
Court echoed the Public Trust Doctrine's English common law roots
when it ruled that public trust lands "were held by the [s]tate, as they
were by the king, in trust for the public uses. 2 6 These "public uses," the
Court said, are "always paramount., 27 Nevertheless, the Court left it to
the individual states to determine the development and implementation
of the Public Trust Doctrine.28
The Public Trust Doctrine states that lands underneath coastal waters
up to the mean high tide mark are held by the state in trust for the
people.29 The Supreme Court, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,"'
22. Id. (making the distinction between the two types of title in the English common
law that are the basis of the Public Trust Doctrine: jusprivatum, the lesser title held by the
king, which concerns the right of the king to alienate the trust lands subject to the rights of
the public; and jus publicum, the dominant title held by the public, which concerns the
right to use the land for navigation, commerce, and fishing).
23. Id. at 183; see also Donald D. Cooper, In Recreation We Trust.- The Public Trust
Doctrine After Fafard, 45 BOSTON B. J. Sept./Oct. 2001, at 8, 23-24 (discussing the
development of the Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts from colonial times through
the present day).
24. Langella, supra note 20, at 183. Aside from the difference from state to state, the
United States's federal system requires that the federal government's interest focus on
interstate commerce in navigable waters while each state's interest centers on navigable
waters within the state. Id.
25. Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1925. The case in question, Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), arose when the state of Illinois granted a large portion of the
Chicago waterfront along Lake Michigan to the railroad company as a private owner. Id.
at 433-34. In response, the Attorney General of Illinois, on behalf of Illinois citizens,
challenged the railroad's rightful ownership of the property. Id. at 433.
26. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 457. The opinion went on to state that "[b]eing subject
to this trust, [the lands] were publicijuris, in other words, they were held for the use of the
people at large." Id.
27. Id at 457.
28. Langella, supra note 20, at 185.
29. I11. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435; see also Egan, supra note 6.
30. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
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held that these lands were given to each state when it entered the
Union.31 The Court also considered alternative means for delineating the
boundaries of public trust lands, but determined that "the ebb-and-flow
rule ha[d] the benefit of 'uniformity and certainty, and . . . eas[e] of
application.",2
However, uniformity, certainty, and ease of application have not
always been the norm. Complicated issues have arisen regarding where
to draw the line between public and private lands, a question that Illinois
Central Railroad left to the states to decide.33 Some states draw the line
granting beachgoers more "dry sand" area (the area above the high tide
mark) for recreation, while other states draw the line much closer to the
low tide mark. With New Jersey leading the way, many states have
added the idea that actual access to the beach must be granted.35
2. New Jersey.- Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Its Fullest
Depending on the state, access to public trust coastal lands is provided
for in different ways, or not provided for at all.36 New Jersey courts have
31. Id. at 481; see also Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 457 (stating that "prior to the
Revolution, the shore and lands under water of the navigable streams and waters of the
province of New Jersey belonged to the King of Great Britain as part of the jura regalia of
the crown, and devolved to the State by right of conquest").
32. Phillps Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 481 (citing Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 379
(1867)). In addition, the Court admonished that the expectations of property owners must
be honored only where they are reasonable. Id. at 482. Because Mississippi had so
frequently asserted its public trust interest in the state's tidelands, the Court stated that
"[a]ny contrary expectations cannot be considered reasonable." Id.
33. Cox, supra note 13 (commenting that in Illinois Central Railroad, the Supreme
Court "established that beaches belong to the citizenry under the public trust doctrine but
left it to states to draw the lines").
34. Id.; see also Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1916 ("Generally, the mean high tide line is
the line of demarcation between private and state ownership. Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia have historically used the low water mark as
the line of demarcation, a line more favorable to private landowners.") (footnotes
omitted).
35. Cox, supra note 13. California is another leader in providing for beach access. Id
(commenting that California's leadership on the issue of access was so strong that
"unimpeded beach access became known, along with mayonnaise on hamburgers, as a
West Coast cultural phenomenon").
36. See Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1915-16; see also Alice Gibbon Carmichael,
Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners.: Public Access to North Carolina
Beaches, 64 N.C. L. REV. 159, 191 (1985) (noting that "[a]t least six jurisdictions have
enacted legislation designed to secure a public right of beach access"). In addition to
California, Texas and Hawaii have provided for or encourage access routes via statute.
Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1915. New Jersey, as discussed infra, has done so primarily
through judicial decision. Other states, such as Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Virginia, have adopted more stringent guidelines when it comes to public
[Vol. 52:10151020
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been both pioneers and leaders in their application of the Public Trust
Doctrine, being among the first to both discuss the concept and to
expand its usage." In the 1821 case of Arnold v. Mundy, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated that "where the tide ebbs and flows, the
ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the
land under the water ... are common to all the people, and that each has
a right to use them according to his pleasure."39 For many years after this
first enunciation of the Public Trust Doctrine, however, the public's
rights under it slowly eroded.4 It was not until the early 1970s that the
New Jersey courts began to reassert themselves in order to restore the
Public Trust Doctrine and expand its scope."
New Jersey's first great expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine came in
1972 when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Borough of Neptune
City v. Borough of A von-by-the-Sea. 2 In Avon, the court expanded the
Public Trust Doctrine to include dry upland shore areas in addition to
those under "where the tide ebbs and flows. ' 43 The court said that the
Public Trust Doctrine was "not limited to the ancient prerogatives of
navigation and fishing, but extend[ed] as well to recreational uses,
including bathing, swimming and other shore activities."
44
In addition to allowing the Public Trust Doctrine to cover dry sand
areas, the court also held that public trust lands were inalienable. 5
Following Arnold, New Jersey courts had repeatedly held that the
legislature's power to convey trust lands to private parties was
unlimited.4' The A von court, however, explicitly stated that "control of
the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can
property ownership and have rejected efforts to expand public rights to the states'
beaches. Id. at 1915-16.
37. See Langella, supra note 20, at 198. New Jersey has over 123 miles of coastline
and is "generally regarded as the first state to have judicially recognized the scope and
applicability of the Public Trust Doctrine." Id. at 202.
38. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
39. Id. at 12.
40. Langella, supra note 20, at 199.
41. Id.
42. 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972). This case decided whether an oceanfront community
could charge non-residents higher fees for the use of its beaches than it did residents. Id.
at 48. Rather than address the case from the argument that the disparity in fees amounted
to discrimination, the court applied the Public Trust Doctrine and expanded it to include
upland dry sand areas. Id. at 51.
43. Id. at 50-51.
44. Id. at 54.
45. Id. at 53-54.
46. Langella, supra note 20, at 202.
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be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest
in the lands and waters remaining.
This elucidation of the Public Trust Doctrine's principles did not solve
the problems arising from the legislature's prior improper alienation of
New Jersey's coastal lands, namely the scarcity of beachfront property
available for public use in the state." Nor did the court attempt to
address the possible solution of allowing public access across these now
privately-held lands.4 9 The court did recognize that an obligation to allow
for such access may have been "impliedly impressed ... on the grantee"
due to the "public rights therein."' Nevertheless, the court said that the
case at hand did not require the determination of such issues and left its
resolution for another day."
That day came a decade later when the New Jersey Supreme Court
decided Matthews v. Bay Head ImprovementAss'n.52 In Matthews, the
court included in its discussion not only the extent of public trust lands
and the permissible uses thereof, but also the public's ability to access
public trust lands. 3 The court stated that "[tioday, recognizing the
increasing demand for our State's beaches and the dynamic nature of the
public trust doctrine, we find that the public must be given both access to




Thus, the Matthews case demonstrates the relevance of the Public Trust
Doctrine, not just to areas where the land and sea meet and where the
47. A von, 294 A.2d at 54; see also Langella, supra note 20, at 202 (commenting that
"[i]n essence, the court's holding in Avon salvaged from the depths, the Public Trust
Doctrine's principle of inalienability of trust lands") (footnotes omitted).
48. Langella, supra note 20, at 202-03 (commenting that the court's discussion was
"little more than a lament over past improper legislative action to alienate trust lands.
With no discussion whatsoever of the judiciary's repeated acquiescence to or participation
in such indiscretions, and with apparently little to offer in the way of a solution")
(footnotes omitted); Avon, 294 A.2d at 53 (lamenting that "[r]emaining tidal water
resources still in the ownership of the State are becoming very scarce, demands upon them
by reason of increased population, industrial development and their popularity for
recreational uses and open space are much heavier, and their importance to the public
welfare has become much more apparent").
49. A von, 294 A.2d at 54; see also Langella, supra note 20, at 203 (commenting that
such issues were "left to sink back into the dark and murky depths").
50. A von, 294 A.2d at 54.
51. Id.
52. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). Previous New Jersey cases, including Avon, dealt only
with the public's right to use the dry sand areas of municipally owned beaches. Finnell,
supra note 16, at 642. Matthews, on the other hand, addressed the public's similar
interests in privately owned beaches. 1d.
53. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358. The court set forth the issue as "whether, ancillary to
the public's right to enjoy the tidal lands, the public has a right to gain access through and
to use the dry sand area not owned by a municipality but by a quasi-public body." Id
54. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
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tides flow, but to the adjacent private property that is specifically
necessary for access."
B. Regulatory Takings
1. Foundation: Justice Holmes and the Mystery of Mahon
In recent years, the Supreme Court has focused its takings
jurisprudence on what types of governmental action constitute a taking,
even when the full use of one's property has not been infringed.56 These
controversies have arisen most often in instances of zoning and land use
regulation." Before 1986, in its nearly 200 years of deciding cases, the
Supreme Court found only four instances in which a law or regulation
amounted to a "regulatory taking... 8  Then, in the first ten years of
William H. Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice, the Court found four
more.59 "Regulatory takings" jurisprudence, however, is grounded in
Justice Holmes' 1922 opinion in the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.
60
In Mahon, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, stated that "if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking., 61 Although the
55. Finnell, supra note 16, at 644-45.
56. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615-16 (2001); see also Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 314, 320-21 (2002).
57. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615-16; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320-21. Id.
Both of these cases, but especially Tahoe-Sierra, were considered setbacks for property
rights advocates and marked a departure from the Court's tendency to find takings where
government restrictions limited the use of one's land. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices
Weaken Movement Backing Property Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at Al.
58. Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence":
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
106 YALE L.J. 613, 615 (1996).
59. Id. These four are Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (discussed infra),
Lucas v. S.C Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (discussed infra), Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (discussed infra), and Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987).
60. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). This case involved a deed transfer where the property owner
sold the surface rights but expressly retained the right to remove the subsurface coal. Id.
at 412. A Pennsylvania statute, the Kohler Act, prohibited the mining of any coal that
would lead to the subsidence of any house built upon the land, unless the house was
owned by the owner of the underlying coal. Id. at 412-13. As a result of the Act, coal
removal was impossible, thus eviscerating the value of the owner's retained removal rights.
Id. at 413. The Court held that this diminution in the owner's coal removal rights
amounted to a taking worthy of just compensation. Id. at 414-15.
61. Id. at 415. Exactly what Justice Holmes meant by "too far" has been the subject
of much discussion and deliberation. See, e.g., Brauneis, supra note 58, at 617; Danaya C.
Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking Can Recreational Trails Survive
the Court's Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence?, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399, 416
(2001).
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challenged regulation in Mahon was arguably for the public good, Justice
Holmes warned against the "danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.,62 In short, "just compensation" is necessary.
6
1
Justice Holmes' opinion in Mahon has been called "both the most
important and most mysterious writing in takings law., 64 Indeed, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has concluded that Mahon is "the foundation of our
'regulatory takings' jurisprudence. 6 ' Given the high regard in which the
Chief Justice and several of his Associate Justices hold this opinion,
along with the Rehnquist Court's tendency to find laws to be regulatory
takings, one can appreciate why the opinion is fundamental to modern
66takings jurisprudence. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it remains
67something of an enigma.
Much of the mystery and confusion revolves around what Justice
Holmes meant when he referred to a regulation going "too far., 68 Justice
Scalia, while praising the originality of the opinion, noted this uncertainty
when he stated that Justice Holmes "offered little insight into when, and
under what circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going 'too
62. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
63. U.S. CONST. amend V. It was common practice in the region for coal mining
companies to pay compensation to the surface property owners for any subsidence caused
by their mining. James E. Krier, Takings From Freund to Fischel, 84 GEO. L.J. 1895, 1897
(1996). This was the practice both before and after the enactment of the Kohler Act. Id
Indeed, even the Mahon decision had little impact on the mining companies' activities. Id
64. Brauneis, supra note 58, at 615 (quoting BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 156 (1977)).
65. 1d. at 615-16 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480
U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
66. See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). In Lucas,
Justice Scalia credited Justice Holmes with inventing the idea of regulatory takings, saying
"if the protection against physical appropriations of private property was to be
meaningfully enforced, the government's power to redefine the range of interests included
in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits." Id. But
see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406-07 (1994). Here, Justice Stevens recognized
in dissent that "Justice Holmes charted a significant new course" but also noted that "[t]he
so-called 'regulatory takings' doctrine that the Holmes dictum kindled" is a "potentially
open-ended source[] of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that
Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair." 1d. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Brauneis, supra note 58, at 617. Professor Brauneis further notes that that "if
Mahon is celebrated for its originality and fecundity, it is also blamed for the muddled
state of regulatory takings doctrine." 1d.
68. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.").
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far' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment., 69 Moreover, the opinion has
been embraced both by those who view diminution in property value as
the appropriate barometer for finding a regulatory taking, as well as
those who endorse the use of a balancing test.U Neither test has
managed to achieve a consensus among academics or within the Court
itself."
2. Development.- Revisiting (and Clarifying) Mahon
More than fifty years after Mahon, the Court revisited the issue of
regulatory takings in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City. The Court's opinion in Penn Central noted that Mahon stood for
the notion "that a state statute that substantially furthers important
public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations
as to amount to a 'taking.' 73  The Court concluded that the "too far"
language required "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries., 4  Justice
69. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. During his Supreme Court confirmation, then-Judge
Breyer also noted this confusion:
When does a reasonable regulation become a taking of property for which you
must pay compensation? You know what Justice Holmes said. You are going to
be disappointed, but what he said was this. He said, 'You don't have to
compensate, when you regulate. But, Government, you cannot go too far.'
What is too far? Indeed, ever since that time, the courts have been trying to
work out what is too far, and I don't think anyone has gotten a perfect measure
of that.
Brauneis, supra note 58, at 618 n.20 (quoting Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.- Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 110, 111 (1994) (testimony of Judge Breyer)).
70. Brauneis, supra note 58, at 616-17.
71. Id. ("Academic [acknowledgment] of a balancing test in Mahon runs a close
second to acknowledgment of a dimunition in value test.") (footnote omitted).
72. In the fifty years since Mahon, the Court had "heard no land-use cases of
substance, [and] state courts whittled away much of the decision's chilling effect on land-
use regulation." David L. Callies, Takings Clause-Take Three, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987,
at 48. "[B]eginning in 1978 [with Penn Centra4 the Court accepted a series of cases
addressing the key issues raised in [Mahon]: (1) When has a regulation gone 'too far'? and
(2) Is compensation an appropriate remedy, once the 'too far' has been reached?" Id
The issue in Penn Centralwas "whether a city may, as part of a comprehensive program to
preserve historic landmarks and historic districts, place restrictions on the development of
individual historic landmarks ... without effecting a 'taking' requiring the payment of 'just
compensation."' Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
Specifically, the case decided whether New York City could block the owners of the parcel
of land upon which Grand Central Terminal was built from erecting a much larger
building on the terminal's roof. Id. at 116.
73. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127. The Court noted that in Mahon, because the
statute rendered coal mining "commercially impracticable," it effectively destroyed the
owner's rights to the underlying coal. Id. Accordingly, "the statute was invalid as
effecting a 'taking' without just compensation." Id at 127-28 (internal citations omitted).
74. Id. at 124.
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Brennan's majority opinion outlined a three-factor test to use in making
these ad hoc determinations: (1) the "economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant;" (2) "the extent to which the regulation interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations;" and (3) "the character of the
governmental action."75 Essentially, the Court held that a fact-specific
inquiry must be made as to the circumstances surrounding each
regulation and its purported effect.76
Using this type of inquiry, the Court did not find a taking in Penn
Central7 Rather, it said that because the "restrictions imposed [were]
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare" (see factor
3 above) and permitted "reasonable beneficial use" of the property (see
factor 1 above), the regulations did not suggest such a finding. 8
However, the Court did add something new to the conventional
regulatory takings tests and jurisprudence: consideration of the property
owner's "distinct investment backed expectations. '"7'
3. The Rehnquist Court.- The Pendulum Swings
a. The "Essential Nexus" Requirement." Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission""
Nollan concerned a regulation imposed by the California Coastal
Commission requiring any beachfront home owner seeking to replace an
existing single family home to grant a public access easement across his
property.' The Nollans had a small bungalow on their oceanfront lot
and wanted to replace it with a larger one but balked at granting a public
easement."' They brought suit in County Superior Court, which struck
down the condition, only to have the condition reimposed by the
75. Id.
76. Id. ("[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government."). Id
77. Id. at 138 (holding that "[o]n this record, we conclude that the application of New
York City's Landmarks Law has not effected a 'taking' of appellants' property").
78. Id. In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist signalled the direction that he would take
the Court as Chief Justice. He remarked that the City of New York had "destroyed--in a
literal sense, 'taken'--substantial property rights of Penn Central." Id. at 143 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 127; see also JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1165 (4th
ed. 1998) (discussing how this new concept has been interpreted).
80. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
81. Id. at 827-29.
82. Id.
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California Court of Appeals 3 The United States Supreme Court
ultimately reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.84
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the government could
validly condition a development permit on the granting of an access
easement only where the easement was reasonably related to mitigating
the harmful effects of the proposed development."' The Court found that
the Commission's conditions on the Nollans' development lacked this
"essential nexus" and were, therefore, invalid.86 The Court held the
easements constituted a "permanent physical occupation" and thus
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment.8 ' The Court noted that
if the State wanted to obtain such easements, it must do so through use of
its eminent domain power.8
Nollan severely limited California's attempt to obtain beach access
89easements throughout the state . In California, public beach access is
guaranteed in its constitution 9" and provided for by statute.9 Legally,
there is no such thing as a private beach anywhere along the 1,160 miles
of California coastline.92 However, the statute's main component had
been the requirement that property owners grant beach access easements
83. Id. at 829-30.
84. Id. at 841-42.
85. Id. at 836-37 (stating "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land
use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion"') (citing J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432
A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
86. Id. at 837 (equating the Commission's scheme to a law forbidding "shouting fire
in a crowded theater, but grant[ing] dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the
state treasury").
87. rd. at 831-32, 841-42. The case turned on whether the permit condition (i.e., the
mandated easement) served the same governmental purpose as the building restriction.
Id. at 836-37. The Court deemed that it did not and that conditioning one on the other
was not a valid use of the police power and, hence, a violation. Id. at 837.
88. Id. at 832.
89. Egan, supra note 6. Many property owners think that the limitations enunciated
by Nollan should apply retroactively to the easements they granted in the early 1980s. Id.
Their argument is that the easements were esstentially "extorted" from the property
owners as a condition for improving upon or expanding their properties. Id
90. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (explicitly stating that no one possessing property that
fronts on any "navigable water" in the state of California may "exclude the right of way to
such water whenever it is required for any public purpose").
91. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30211 (West 2001) ("California Coastal Act")
(mandating that "development shall not interfere with the public's right of access to the
sea").
92. Egan, supra note 6. Compare this to Maine, which has only twenty miles of
publicly owned coastline out of a total of 3800 miles, or Massachusetts, where only 300 out
of a total of 1500 miles of shoreline is available for public use. Kehoe, supra note 4, at
1916, n.15.
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across their property in exchange for development permits.93  This
component was restricted in Nollan.
Nollan implicates the Public Trust Doctrine as it impacted California's
plan to provide access to public trust lands, but the extent of those
implications is debatable. 94 In fact, the majority in Nollan did not make
any reference to the Public Trust Doctrine in its decision, likely because
neither party argued it.95  Because Nollan concerned a statutory
regulation of lands not traditionally considered part of the Public Trust,
the case was treated as a takings dispute, not a Public Trust dispute.6
Takings disputes involving lands lying adjacent to public trust lands, such
as beachfront private property that blocks public beach access,
necessarily implicate the Public Trust Doctrine.97
b. Taking as "Total Deprivation "" Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council9"
In 1986, David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots on the coast of
South Carolina.99 He intended to build one single-family home on each
parcel, one for his family and one for resale.' °° His plans were thwarted
when, in 1988, the South Carolina legislature passed the Beachfront
93. See Doherty, supra note 10.
94. Finnell, supra note 16, at 633.
95. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 (1987). The majority observed
that the Commission did not advance a Public Trust Doctrine argument based on Art. X,
§4 of the California Constitution in the Court of Appeals, and "the Nollans argued in the
Superior Court that any claim that there was a pre-existing public right of access had to be
asserted through a quiet title action, which the Commission, possessing no claim to the
easement itself, probably would not have had standing under California law to bring.") Id.
(citation omitted) This Note will discuss the concept of pre-existing public rights infra at
Part 1II.B.1.
96. See Finnell, supra note 16, at 664-65. Professor Finnell suggests that "Nollan can
be classified as a physical invasion case," and that the "Court closely examined the facts
because of the physical invasion of the Nollans' land, then found a taking because the
nexus between the burden on the Nollans and the governmental end was inadequate." Id.
at 665. Finnell posits that, alternatively, Nollan "constitutes a new category of takings
cases in which the Court first considers the nexus question and, if the connection is
insufficient, declares a taking without engaging in a multifactored balancing process,"
which would require analysis under the Public Trust Doctrine Id. at 665-66.
97. See id.; see also Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (stating
"[lands adjacent to or near navigable waters exist in a special relationship to the state ...
and are subject to the state public trust powers").
98. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
99. Id. at 1006-07.
100. Hope M. Babcock, Has the US. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of
Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on
Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995).
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Management Act, °' which prohibited development seaward of a setback
line.' 2  Because Lucas's lots were largely seaward of this line, he
challenged the Act's constitutionality, alleging that it robbed him of all
economically beneficial use of his property and, thus, amounted to a
taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.'0 3 The state trial
court ruled in Lucas's favor and awarded him over $1.2 million in "just
compensation. " The State Supreme Court subsequently overturned
the award, Lucas appealed, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorar0.
Writing for the majority in Lucas, Justice Scalia stated that the Penn
Central test should not be used in a total regulatory taking case, such as
this, but only when a court is asked to determine if there has been a
partial regulatory taking.'O When determining if a total regulatory
taking has occurred, the proper inquiry according to the Court is whether
the "regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."'' 7 The Court stated that a "total deprivation of beneficial use is,
from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation. '  In such cases, it was not necessary to go into the "ad
hoc" test described in Penn Central and engage in the "case-specific
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.' 109
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290 (West Supp. 2002) (providing that "[njo new
construction or reconstruction is allowed seaward of the baseline except: (1) wooden
walkways... (2) small wooden decks... (3) fishing piers which are open to the public...
(4) golf courses . . . (5) normal landscaping . . . (6) structures specifically permitted by
special permit[, and] ... (7) pools may be reconstructed if they are landward of an existing,
functional erosion control structure or device").
102. Babcock, supra note 100. This "setback line" was established by the South
Carolina Coastal Council by connecting the landward-most points of erosion during the
prior forty years. Id. at 12 n.56. The baseline established on the island on which Lucas's
property was located "effectively blocked him from developing his land." Id.
103. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07; Babcock, supra note 100, at 12-13.
104. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009. The exact award was $1,232,387.50. Id. Lucas had
purchased the lots for $975,000. Id. at 1006.
105. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 502 U.S. 966 (1991), rev'd, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Lucas conceded that the Beachfront Management Act was a legitimate effort on the part
of the state to preserve South Carolina's beaches. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009-10. He had
long been involved in the development of Isle de Palms, the barrier beach on which his
lots were located, and was well aware of the fluctuations in the shoreline due to erosion.
John R. Nolon, High Court's 'Lucas' Decision Leaves Shifting Sands in Regulatory
Takings Law, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1992, at 1. He argued that because the Act denied him all
economically viable use of his property, he deserved to be compensated. Id,
106. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014-19.
107. Id. at 1015, 1017-18.
108. Id. at 1017.
109. Id. at 1015.
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Although Lucas is a very important decision in the annals of regulatory
takings jurisprudence, it provides guidance only when there has been a
total regulatory taking.' Because of the opinion's arguably narrow
scope, at its announcement, many observers were divided over what it
actually meant and what its implications were for future disputes.' Even
as property rights advocates welcomed another favorable ruling from the
Rehnquist Court, many were dissatisfied that the opinion did not do
more to clarify the law on partial takings, which have been considerably
more common than total takings."'
Moreover, the Court left an opening for regulators in its discussion of
"background principles of the [s]tate's law.""' 3 The only way a state can
defend against a total taking without compensation is to show that, due
to some "background principle" in the state's laws, the property interest
supposedly "taken" was not originally part of the property owner's
title." 4 The Court noted in dicta that it "assuredly would permit the
government to assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing
limitation upon the landowner's title."
' 5
110. Daniel Summerlin, Note, Improving Public Access to Coastal Beaches: The
Effect of Statutory Management and the Public Trust Doctrine, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REV. 425, 435 (stating that Lucas "offered no guidance as to what happens
when there is only a partial taking").
111. See Dwight Merriam, Lucas. Has Takings Law Been Set Adrift Once More?,
CONN. L. TRIB., July 13, 1992, at 20 (noting that "the [Amicus Curiae Committee of the
American Planning Ass'n] seems quite divided on what Lucas means" with himself
standing "at one extreme, believing that Lucas is very narrow decision on both the facts
and the laws" and his colleague, Professor Norman Williams, Jr., standing at the other
extreme, believing "that the Lucas decision reflects yet another step in Chief Justice
William Rehnquist's 'conspiracy' to shift the Court to greater protection for private
property rights").
112. Daniel J. Popeo & Paul D. Kamenar, In Lucas's Wake, Whither the Law of
Takings?; The Tide Has Finally Turned in Favor of Property Rights, N.J.L.J., Aug. 3,1992,
at 15 (noting that "many property-rights advocates remain disappointed and dissatisfied
even with this victory").
113. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
114. Daniel A. Nussbaum, Note, McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
Presenting the Question of the Relevance of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Total
Regulatory Takings Analysis, 53 S.C. L. REV. 509, 512 (2002); see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027
(noting that "[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with"(footnote omitted)).
115. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29.
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c. ClarifyingNollan andLucas: Dolan v. City of Tigard1 6 and
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island"'
The Supreme Court heard arguments in Dolan two years after Lucas
and, in its opinion, further refined the test it had previously laid out in
Nollan."8 Dolan involved a situation similar to Nollan in which a
development permit was conditioned upon the property owner granting a
public easement. "9 Applying the Nollan "essential nexus" test, the Court
found the necessary connection between the public purposes sought to
be furthered, the prevention of flooding and the reduction of traffic
congestion, and the requirement on the property owner to dedicate a
portion of her property for a storm drainage system and bicycle path.
120
The Court then went one step further and required a showing that there
be a "rough proportionality" between the requirement and the harm
posed.'2' This increased the burden on states attempting to require
easements across private property.12
In Palazzolo, a landowner sued over a denial of his request for
permission to fill in the wetlands portion of his property in order to
develop it. ' He argued that denying him a permit to use his property in
116. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
117. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
118. Summerlin, supra note 110, at 435.
119. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80. Florence Dolan owned a plumbing and electric supply
store on a 1.67 acre site that included a gravel parking lot. Id. at 379. She applied for a
permit to redevelop the site by nearly doubling the size of her store and paving the
parking lot. Id. The City Planning Commission approved her proposed plans on the
condition that she dedicate a portion of the property for improvement of a storm drainage
system and placement of a 15-foot strip for a pedestrian or bicycle pathway. Id. at 379-80.
These requirements were applied because the property was located within the 100-year
floodplain of a nearby creek. Id. The dedicated area would amount to approximately ten
percent of her total property. Id. at 380.
120. Id. at 386-87.
121. ld. at 391 (stating that "[w]e think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best
encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment").
122. Summerlin, supra note 110, at 436. Along with Nollan and Lucas, Dolan
"show[ed] that the Supreme Court [was] adopting a pro-private property rights stance."
Id; see also Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking Can
Recreational Trails Survive the Court's Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence, 26
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399, 419 (2001). The Nolan/Dolan test subjects governmental
objectives and the means used to obtain those ends to a heightened level of scrutiny,
threatening to replace the deferential minimum scrutiny traditionally given to facial
challenges of regulations with a stricter takings test. Id.
123. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611-16 (2001). Palazzolo's plan was to
carve the property up into seventy-four lots, a plan which "if realized, would have created
a cottage development . . . within the reaches of the middle class." Brian Bishop,
Whitehouse Loses War on Property Rights, PROVIDENCE J.-BULLETIN, July 17, 2001, at
4B.
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this way constituted a regulatory taking.1 14 The Supreme Court found
that the state regulation at issue effected only a partial regulatory taking
because the landowner was not deprived of all beneficial use of his
property; he could still develop the uplands portion. 125 The Court opted
not to apply the reasoning of Lucas and it remanded the case for a partial
regulatory takings analysis under Penn Central.
126
d Turning the Tide on Property Rights and Regulatory Takings.
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency
127
The landmark ruling that property rights advocates were hoping for in
Palazzolo came later in Tahoe-Sierra. Much to their chagrin, it was not
a victory but a defeat, as Tahoe-Sierra upheld the right of the
government to temporarily ban development of private property without
having to compensate property owners. 129 The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra
were hundreds of people who had purchased plots of land along the
shores of Lake Tahoe that later became subject to a temporary
moratorium on development."3 Relying on Lucas, the property owners
argued that even a temporary restriction on the use of land that strips it
of all "economically viable" use is a taking worthy of compensation.131
124. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 611.
125. Id. at 630-32. "[A] [s]tate may not evade the duty to compensate on the premise
that the landowner is left with a token interest[, however,] ... [a] regulation permitting a
landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the
property 'economically idle."' Id. at 631 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 (1992)).
126. Id. at 630-32. So, after a "muddled ruling" the case went back to state court.
Anthony Flint, Landlocked on the Coast for 40 Years, Anthony Palazzolo Has Battled
R.I Over Property Rights, All the Way to the Supreme Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3,
2002, at BI (describing Mr. Palazzolo's frustration about the inability to build on his land,
his resignation over returning to state court, and his disappointment that the Supreme
Court did not issue a clearer ruling, making his a landmark case).
"I never got one penny off this land. All I got is tax bills," he said on a recent
walk through the property, gulls skimming over the shallow, salty water before
him. "You think those guys fighting the Revolutionary War wanted us to have to
ask the next person, 'Can I do this with my land?' [Expletive]. They were
tough."
Id, Palazzolo, now 82, acknowledges that the land will never be developed and wonders
who, if anyone, will pay for it. Id.
127. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
128. Flint, supra note 126 (commenting that Palazzolo was "a muddled ruling, eclipsed
in significance a few months later by a case out of Lake Tahoe that more clearly sided with
government's right to control development").
129. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321, 341-42.
130. Id. at 311-12.
131. Id, at 316.
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However, the Court limited Lucas to the "extraordinary circumstance"
in which a government regulation "deprives a property owner of all
economic use" and found that a temporary moratorium on development
did not constitute such a deprivation.132 Given the expanded protection
granted property owners under Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan, Tahoe-Sierra
is viewed as a setback for the property rights movement. 13 It marked a
departure from the Court's tendency to strictly uphold property rights
and changed the way land use decisions would be made at all levels of
government. 134
III. How THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE CAN ENABLE STATES TO
PROVIDE FOR BEACH ACCESS
A. Distinguishing Lateral and Perpendicular Access
To some extent, nearly all states recognize the public's right to the
tidelands held under the Public Trust Doctrine.'35 Similarly, nearly all
states allow the public to tread over and upon these lands as long as they
do not encroach upon any adjacent private property.136 This type of
access is known as lateral access.137
Perpendicular access is another matter entirely, and the one that will
be the concern of the remainder of this Note.138 Perpendicular access
refers to the public's right to access the shoreline by crossing the private
land of another. 19  While nearly all states recognize the public's right to
lateral access, California and New Jersey are among the few that have
sought to enforce perpendicular access.1
4 0
132. Id. at 337, 341-42.
133. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Weaken Movement Backing Property Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at Al (stating that "[t]oday's decision had the effect of limiting some
of the [C]ourt's recent property rights rulings and left property rights advocates
scrambling to minimize the scope of their defeat, at least for public consumption"). It was
also seen as a "stinging defeat to nearly 700 families who bought lots near Lake Tahoe in
the late 1970s. They hoped to build vacation or retirement homes there but soon ran afoul
of new environmental rules." David G. Savage, Landowners Dealt a Blow by Justices,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at Al.
134. See Savage, supra note 133. "The 6-3 ruling is an important victory for city
planners, state officials and environmentalists nationwide. It reaffirms the broad authority
of local and state officials to control development and regulate property." Id.
135. See supra text accompanying note 24; see also Summerlin, supra note 110, at 425.
136. Summerlin, supra note 110, at 425.
137. Id.
138. ld. at 426.
139. Id.
140. See supra Section I (outlining efforts to provide for beach access easements in
California); see also supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text (discussing the development
of the Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey); see also Summerlin, supra note 110, at 426
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The lack of perpendicular access in most states has led to a scenario
where beaches are purportedly open to and even owned by the public,
but are completely inaccessible. 14 With increasing private development
of the shoreline, this problem is likely to worsen in the coming years.
42
Therefore, state governments must be given the power to uphold their
rights and responsibilities as trustees of these lands through providing
greater opportunities for perpendicular access to beaches. While some
states have used such common law means as custom,' 44 prescription,' 45
(noting that "[t]he nearly unanimous rule is that the public trust doctrine does not grant
the public any right or privilege of perpendicular access by crossing over private land").
141. Summerlin, supra note 110, at 426-27 (pointing out that absent reasonable access
to the shore, the rights granted by the Public Trust Doctrine are effectively nonexistent);
see also Langella, supra note 20, at 184 (noting that "this missing right [of perpendicular
access] has resulted in the absurd situation of beaches open to the public but with no way
for the public to reach them").
142. Summerlin, supra note 110, at 425.
143. See Finnell, supra note 6, at 680 (highlighting the need "to establish and protect
accessways to public property under all available common law theories").
144. See id. at 637-40. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that the
public's use of the dry sand areas of its beaches met all the requirements of custom and
was therefore protected. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676-77 (Or. 1969).
The requirements outlined by the court were that the usage be (1) "ancient;" (2)
"exercised without interruption;" (3) "peaceable and free from dispute;" (4) reasonable;
(5) certain; (6) "obligatory;" and (7) not "repugnant, or inconsistent, with other customs
or with other law." Id. at 677.
More recently, the Oregon Supreme Court applied the notion of custom, discussed in
Thornton, to uphold the right of the public to access the dry sand areas of beaches.
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993). The court said that when
the owners of the beachfront property "took title to their land, they were on notice that
exclusive use of the dry sand areas was not a part of the 'bundle of rights' that they
acquired, because public use of dry sand areas 'is so notorious that notice of the custom on
the part of the person buying land along the shore must be presumed."' Id. (quoting
Thornton, 462 P.2d at 678).
Texas has also used the concept of custom to allow for public easements across private
property for beach access. Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). In
Matcha, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that
the "public had acquired [an] easement and right of access and use" because of "a right
retained by virtue of continuous right in the public since time immemorial." Id. at 97. The
court further upheld an injunction that prohibited the property owner from engaging in
any activity that "restrain[ed] or interfer[ed] with the right of the public, individually or
collectively, to free and unrestricted access to and use of the beach area." Id. at 98. While
the use of custom in this way has gained some favor in recent years, it is still not uniformly
recognized by American courts. Finnell, supra note 16, at 644.
145. See Finnell, supra note 16, at 631-32. Most states recognize that continuous
public use of a beach by the public can create a prescriptive easement. Langella, supra
note 20, at 187. For example, the public's right to access a Texas beach was upheld by
prescription in the case of Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). The
court in Moody held that "[tihe general public ... may acquire beaches by prescription if it
can be established that the public has met all the requirements for adverse possession."
Id. at 378. However, it would be far more difficult for the general public to gain access to
[Vol. 52:10151034
Taking Stock in the Public Trust Doctrine
and dedication 146 to find public access easements, this Note will show that
the Public Trust Doctrine remains the most effective way to provide for
beach access."'
B. Reconciling Public Access Easements Under the Public Trust
Doctrine With Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
148
1. Prior Existing Right of Use
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Court noted that there are
no constitutional limitations on the right of the states to enforce pre-
existing trust rights. 49 The Court reiterated this notion in Lucas when it
noted that states need not compensate property owners for a complete
regulatory taking when "the proscribed use interests were not part of
[the property owner's] title to begin with."'"5 Thus, a state's exercise of
its pre-existing right to provide access to the beachfront across a
a beach. See Langella, supra note 20, at 187 (recognizing the difficulties in obtaining
prescriptive easements). Making the issue more difficult is the fact that "[p]ermissive use
can defeat an alleged prescriptive easement in the public." Finnell, supra note 16, at 632
(citing City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974)).
146. See Finnell, supra note 16, at 633-37. A property owner may also expressly or
implicitly dedicate lands to public use. ld. If the public accepts such a dedication, the
transfer to the public is complete. Id. Dedication cases are troublesome, because it must
be shown that the property owner intended to dedicate the land to the public. Id.; see,
e.g., Dept. of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 635 (Md. 1975) (holding
that a "clear and unequivocal manifestation" of the property owner's intent was necessary
before the court would find an implied dedication); see also City of Palmetto v. Katsch, 98
So. 352, 353 (Fla. 1923) (establishing the rule that "the intention of the owner to set apart
the lands for the use of the public is the foundation and essence of every dedication").
147. See Finnell, supra note 16, at 677 ("The public trust doctrine should become the
theoretical foundation for assuring reasonable public access to coastal public property.");
see also Summerlin, supra note 110, at 437 (1996) (commenting that the Public Trust
Doctrine is the least expensive means of resolving the beach access dilemma); Carmichael.
supra note 36, at 201 (recommending expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine to include
"recreational use of the dry-sand beach," and noting that the "public trust doctrine is
meaningless without access to the foreshore").
148. Traditionally, the Public Trust Doctrine has shielded government from Fifth
Amendment takings claims. Summerlin, supra note 110, at 429. The Public Trust
Doctrine is grounded in property and trust law and has more to do with the property rights
of the state vis a vis the public, and less to do with the police power of the state. Id. at 430.
The government would not be found in violation of the Takings Clause so long as it was
acting in its capacity as trustee of the land and had not breached its duty to the public. Id.
The purpose of the Doctrine is "to ensure the public's ability to fully enjoy the waters and
lands held in trust" and the clear beneficiary of the trust is the public. Id Therefore, "if
the trust is to have any practical meaning, the public must possess the right to reach these
areas." Id. at 430.
149. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483 (1988).
150. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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property-owner's land cannot accurately be considered to have "taken"
anything from the property owner's "bundle of rights.'
5
1
In the context of Nollan, the majority observed that the Court has
"repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private
use, the right to exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."'52 This
ignores the provision in the California Constitution that explicitly states
that no one possessing property that fronts on "any navigable water" in
the state may "exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is
required for any public purpose."'5 3
Thus, in California, the right to exclude is not included in the "bundle
of rights" that property owners acquire when they obtain title to beach
front property. 54  What one never had cannot be taken away. 155
Considering Justice Brennan's dissent in Nollan, in which he stated that
"[t]he public's expectation of access considerably antedates any private
development on the coast," the conclusion can be drawn that even absent
a state constitutional provision for such, the public has a pre-existing
right of access to the sea that is not abrogated by private development.56
2. The Nollan "Essential Nexus" Test
Arguably, the Court's ruling in Nollan is not nearly as broad as it might
seem, and does not limit the states' ability to ensure access as much as it
might appear.157 The Court recognized that a "land-use regulation does
not effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests
and does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land."'58 In
151. See id
152. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (internal quotations
omitted).
153. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
154. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (noting that the Court's "takings jurisprudence...
has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content
of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they obtain
title to property").
155. Id. Before determining if a taking has occurred, the Court had to first inquire
"into the nature of the owner's estate" in order to determine if the interests being taken
were ever part of the owner's title in the first place. Id.
156. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argues that the
majority's opinion is "based on the assumption that private landowners in this case possess
a reasonable expectation regarding the use of their land that the public has attempted to
disrupt." Id. Justice Brennan concludes that "the situation is precisely the reverse: it is
private landowners who are the interlopers." Id.
157. See Finnell, supra note 16 at 680.
158. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (internal quotations omitted). The Court goes on to note
that its "cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a
legitimate state interest or what type of connection between the regulation and the state
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Nollan's case, the Court merely found that there was no "nexus between
the condition" (the required easement dedication) and "the original
purpose of the building restriction" (providing visual access to the
ocean).159
The Court further acknowledged that the condition on development
would have been constitutional had it been related to the Public Trust
Doctrine and people's right to access public lands, rather than an access
easement, a "requirement that the [property owners] provide a viewing
spot on their property for passersby."' 6  Such a requirement would
"further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition" and
would not have been a taking but, rather "a legitimate exercise of the
[state's] police power. 161 As it turned out, the Commission did not assert
a legitimate state interest in providing access to public trust lands and
never mentioned the Public Trust Doctrine in its arguments in defense of
the condition.1 2 Thus, a piece of property's proximity to public trust
lands and the state's unique responsibility to protect the public's right of
access to such lands is a relevant consideration when determining
whether a regulation amounts to a taking of such property."3
3. Penn Central and "Distinct Investment Backed Expectations"
One of the main propositions of Lucas is that the Penn Centraltest for
partial regulatory takings should be applied unless the "regulation denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of land. ' ' As the Court in
Palazzolo elucidated, when a portion of the land can still be developed, a
complete denial has not been effected.16 ' Hence, when the matter is only
interest satisfies the requirement that the former substantially advance the latter." Id.
(internal quotations and footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 837.
160. Id. at 836.
161. Id. at 836-37.
162. Id. at 833. Only the California Attorney General would have had standing to
assert the public's rights in the dispute and argue that the Public Trust Doctrine supports a
public easement. Finnell, supra note 16, at 664.
163. Finnell, supra note 16, at 665.
164. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). The Court determined
that when "a regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land," it is
appropriate to treat that regulation "as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the
public interest advanced in support of the restraint." Id.
165. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-32 (2001). The United States
Supreme Court agreed with the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in its finding that "all
economically beneficial use was not deprived because the uplands portion of the property
can still be improved," and that even under Rhode Island's wetlands protection
regulations, the petitioner's parcel retained $200,000 in development value. Id. at 630-31.
This amount was not deemed to be the sort of "token interest" that would have required
the state to provide compensation. Id.
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a public access easement across one's property, the total taking
requirement of Lucas as clarified in Palazzolo has not been met, and the
Penn Centraltest for partial takings applies. 
66
Under Penn Central, for a court to find a partial regulatory taking, it
must consider the economic impact upon the claimant along with the
character of the governmental action, and the extent of interference with
the property owner's "distinct investment-backed expectations." '167 Thus,
the question to ask is whether it is reasonable for beachfront property
owners to have the expectation that they will be able to exclude those
seeking to cross their property for the purpose of reaching public trust
lands.' Justice Brennan, who crafted the Penn Central test, suggests in
Nolan that such an expectation is unreasonable. 161
The reasonableness of a property owner's "investment-backed
expectations" must be considered in light of the uniqueness of coastal
lands and the public values associated with them."" Furthermore, a court
must consider the extent to which the easement constitutes an invasion of
the property, diminishes its value, and burdens the property owner. 71 If
the landowner is minimally burdened in this way and his similarly
situated neighbors are similarly burdened, a court should be more
reluctant to find that the regulation effects a taking.' In any case,
166. See id. at 632. The easements being sought in California are nine feet wide.
Kasindorf, supra note 3. At least one of the property owners fighting the proposed
easements lives on an estate of twenty-five acres overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Egan,
supra note 6.
167. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
168. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-37 (1987).
169. Id. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Babcock, supra note 100, at 66 n.354.
(suggesting that "[d]etermining the reasonableness of a landowner's expectations about
her property use rights ... may be a matter of determining whether she had notice, at the
time she acquired the property, of these common law doctrines as well as any changes in
their scope"); see also Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas Implications of the
Public Trust Doctrine on Takings Analysis, '13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537, 564 (1994)
(suggesting that those who take property adjacent to public trust lands do so "with, at
least, constructive knowledge of the state's interpretation of the public trust doctrine").
170. Finnell, supra note 16, at 679 (stating that "courts must carefully account for
public values that are not included in the private owner's 'property' for purposes of the
fifth amendment takings clause").
171. Other considerations must be taken into account. As Justice O'Connor stated in
her concurrence in Palazzolo, "interference with investment-backed expectations is one of
a number of factors that a court must examine" when considering partial regulatory
takings. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
172. Id.
Each person burdened by a harm-prevention regulation is also reciprocally
benefited because similarly situated neighbors are also burdened. The lesson for
coastal regulation is obvious: coastal landowners may be burdened by reasonable
public access exactions; nevertheless, they are reciprocally benefited, both as
individual landowners and as beneficiaries of thejuspublicum.
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whether or not the requirement of an access easement will amount to a
113
taking requires deeper inquiry into the specific facts of each case.
4. Where Tahoe-Sierra Fits
Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court's most recent addition to regulatory
takings jurisprudence, reinforced some of the ideas illustrated above
when it stated that "a regulation that affects only a portion of a parcel-
whether limited by time, use, or space-does not deprive the owner of all
economically beneficial use."'74  Furthermore, the Court noted that
"restrictions on the use of only limited portions of the parcel" are "not
considered regulatory takings."'75 Thus, an easement across a portion of
property would be no more than a partial taking and, as such, subject to
the Penn Central analysis. 7 6  Additionally, Tahoe-Sierra provided
guidance to lower courts when applying this test and performing its "ad
hoc, factual inquiries,"17 reminding them that it is important to focus not
178on any individual factor, but rather on the entire parcel.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public's right of access to this nation's coastline is as old as the
Republic itself. '7 With each passing year and the increase in coastal
development that comes with it, the ability of the majority of Americans
to access the nation's beaches grows more endangered. 8. If the Public
Id.
173. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
174. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
319 (2002). It is difficult to deny that a nine-foot wide beach access easement affects "only
a portion of the parcel" and is "limited by time, use, or space." See id.; see supra note 168.
175. Id. at 326.
176. See id.; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31 (noting that
"'[t]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt
to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with the rights of the parcel as a whole ...." (cited in Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S.
at 326).
177. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 (elaborating on the Penn Central analysis).
178. Id. This reinforced the determination made by the Court in Palazzolo that "a
regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel did
not leave the property economically idle." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631
(2001) (internal quotation omitted).
179. See Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1924 (noting that "after the American Revolution,
the people became sovereign, thereby inheriting all rights in navigable waters and
connected soils previously held by the Crown"); see also supra notes 23-35 and
accompanying text (outlining the historical underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine in
the United States).
180. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Trust Doctrine is to be anything more than a chimera, it must be used
aggressively to provide for real, meaningful access to our nation's
beaches.' Otherwise, these beaches will continue to become essentially
private property and, in many instances, become yet another place where
the haves will be able to exclude the have-nots.'
The Supreme Court has placed limits on the power of the states to
enforce the Public Trust Doctrine, but those limits are far from
insurmountable." The public's right to the shore predates any right of
private property owners to exclude them and, therefore, it is extremely
important that the government protect that right in the face of takings
claims.'m The Public Trust Doctrine provides for the protection of this
right and the state's duty as trustee demands that they stand guard over
it. 
5
181. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that
[w]ithout some means of access the public right to use the foreshore would be
meaningless. To say that the public trust doctrine entitles the public to swim in
the ocean and to use the foreshore in connection therewith without assuring the
public of a feasible access route would seriously impinge on, if not effectively
eliminate, the rights of the public trust doctrine.
Id at 364.
182. See Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1936 ("The more affluent sector of American society
tends to dominate ownership of the beachfront property in the United States. When
wealthy landowners can exclude others from obtaining access to the beaches, in effect,
they own the beach, the foreshore, and the water directly in front of their property.").
183. As noted in Part III.B, supra, the holding in Nollan is not as restrictive as it seems
at first glance, and Tahoe-Sierra reinforces the government's power to make restrictions
on the use of property.
184. See supra Part II.B.1.
185. See Kehoe, supra note 4, at 1951 (arguing that if the states cannot fill this
important responsibility, they should be removed as trustees).
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